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I. Introduction
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of a number of protected characteristics, including race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin.' Therefore, it is unlawful for an employer to terminate an employee on the basis of one
of these characteristics. The constructive discharge doctrine was created to address situations in
which an employer forced the resignation of an employee by creating intolerable working
conditions in an effort to avoid the protections of Title VII. Consequently, "[u]nder the
constructive discharge doctrine, an employee's reasonable decision to resign because of
unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial purposes."
2
The generality of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has made it particularly
difficult for the courts to determine the boundaries of the types of claims that can be brought
under the Act. The United States Supreme Court did not have occasion to reach any major
conclusions on the availability and limitations of constructive discharge claims under Title VII
until the 2004 case of Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders.3 This note examines the Court's
decision in Suders and the evolution of the constructive discharge doctrine, specifically its
applicability to Title VII sexual harassment cases. Part II analyzes the origins and purpose of the
doctrine. Part III discusses the Court's previous decisions in Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth4 and Faragher v. Boca Raton,5 which set the framework for Suders by establishing the
important affirmative defense to Title VII constructive discharge cases that the Court in Suders
more clearly defined. Part IV considers the Supreme Court's decision in Suders in light of
Ellerth and Faragher, and Part V concludes with the practical impact the Suders decision will
have on future employment practices.
II. Evolution of the Constructive Discharge Doctrine
A. The Creation of the Constructive Discharge Doctrine
"Constructive discharge" is defined as "[a] termination of employment brought about by
making the employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee feels compelled to
* Laura Marston is currently a second-year law student at the T.C. Williams School of Law at the University of
Richmond in Richmond, Virginia.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2004) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin .... 1").
2 Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 2351 (2004).
' 124 S. Ct 2342 (2004).
4 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
5 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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leave."6 The concept was originally applied by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in
cases brought under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).7 In re Sterling Corset Co.8 was
the NLRB's first decision to use the term "constructive discharge." 9 The first cases to use the
concept reasoned that anti-discrimination laws were ineffective if employers could merely avoid
the consequences of the laws by creating intolerable working conditions.' 0 After the concept
became firmly established in the labor-law context, the courts recognized the constructive
discharge doctrine, applying it to all types of claims brought under Title VII.I
B. Elements of a Constructive Discharge Claim
"An employer 'is responsible for a constructive discharge in the same manner that it is
responsible for the outright discriminatory discharge of a charging party."" 12 An objective
reasonable employee standard is used by the courts to determine whether an employee has been
constructively discharged. 13 Therefore, the trier of fact must conclude that the employee's
working conditions were made so intolerable that a reasonable person in the same or similar
circumstances as the employee's would have been compelled to quit. 14 This reasonable person
standard allows the trier of fact to disregard any subjective sensitivities the particular plaintiff-
employee may have and ask whether an ordinary person placed in the same working conditions
would have chosen to resign.
Early decisions of the NLRB focused only on illegal conduct of the employer to
determine whether there was a constructive discharge.1 5 As courts developed the concept, two
significant changes were made to the doctrine. 16 The first required intentional discrimination and
specific intent by the employer, and the second required that the employee's response to this
intentional discrimination be reasonable.'
7
6 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 495 (8th ed. 2004).
7 See, e.g. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 888 (1984) (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1191
(1978)) (holding that an unfair labor practice under the NLRA occurred when, in order to hinder involvement in
union activities, an employer created such intolerable working conditions that an employee would be compelled to
resign).
8 9 N.L.R.B. 858 (1938).
9 Shuck, Cathy, That's It, I Quit: Returning to First Principles in Construct Discharge Doctrine, 23 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 401, 406 (2002).
'ld. at 403.
1 See EEOC v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 276 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2002) (religious discrimination); Jackson v.
Arkansas Dept. of Educ., 272 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2001) (sexual harassment); Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d
315 (5th Cir. 1997) (age discrimination); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (sexual harassment).12 Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2352 (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual 612:0006 (2002)).
13 Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65
(5th Cir. 1980)).14 id.
15 Shuck, supra note 9, at 404.
16 id.
17 id..
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Some courts have required that the employer discriminated against the employee who
brought a constructive discharge claim with the intention of compelling the employee to resign.
18
Others, however, have held that an employer's specific intention to make working conditions so
intolerable that the employee would resign was not necessary to satisfy the requirements of a
constructive discharge claim. 19 The NLRB currently requires a showing of specific intent to
establish constructive discharge.
20
The courts then seemed to shift their focus from the intention of the employer to
concentrate on the reasonableness of the employee's response to the employer's conduct. In
analyzing the employee reasonableness standard, "[t]o find that a constructive discharge has
occurred, the trier of fact must be satisfied that the working conditions to which the employee
was subjected were so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes
would have felt compelled to resign." 21 This reasonableness standard is a deviation from the
NLRB's earlier standards for NLRA cases. The Board originally seemed to apply a subjective
standard to the employee when determining whether the decision to quit was reasonable. In
22Clover Fork Coal Co. v. NLRB, the Board determined that a coal loader's resignation was
reasonable in response to a discriminatory transfer because he had been a coal worker for
twenty-one years and would be able to determine whether his work environment was good or
bad.23
In cases today, when courts analyze the employee's reasonableness, two factors are taken
into account: (1) whether the employer engaged in conduct that would be intolerable to a
reasonable person (the objective element), and (2) whether the employee resigned in response to
the prohibited conduct.
III. Title VII Sexual Harassment: Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
The constructive discharge claim at issue in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders stems
from sexual harassment or hostile work environment.24 The United States Supreme Court first
determined that sexual harassment, or "hostile environment," claims were covered by Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the case of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.
25
18 See, e.g., Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the constructively discharged
employee met the employer intent requirement by showing that her employer's conduct made it reasonably
foreseeable that she would quit).
19 Jurgens, 903 F.2d at 390 (citing Bourque, 617 F.2d at 65, n.5 (holding that the employee is not required to prove
that the employer had the specific intention that the employee would resign).
20 Shuck, supra note 9, at n. 52.
21 Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie Asphalt Co., 990 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Bourque, 617 F.2d at 65).
22 97 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1938).
23 Shuck, supra note 9, at 418 (citing In re Clover Fork Coal Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 202, 222 (1937)).
24 Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 2346-47 (2004).
25 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See id. at 63-66.
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A. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson
This 1986 United States Supreme Court case involved a female bank employee who sued
the employer bank and her immediate supervisor, claiming that she had been subjected to sexual
harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.26 The Court held that
"[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." 27 The Court further
asserted that Title VII's language was not limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination,
because "[t]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional
intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in
employment."28 Most importantly, the Vinson court concluded that:
such sexual misconduct constitutes prohibited "sexual harassment," whether or
not it is directly linked to the grant or denial of an economic quidpro quo, where
"such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.,
29
As a result, "hostile environment", or non-ecomonic harassment, was rendered a violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.30
B. The Court's Categorization of "Hostile Work Environment" in Ellerth and Faragher
The cases of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth31 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton32
were Title VII sexual harassment cases decided by the United States Supreme Court on the same
day in 1998. Following the lead of Vinson, these cases distinguished "two categories of hostile
work environment claims: (1) harassment that 'culminates in a tangible employment action' for
which employers are strictly liable, and (2) harassment that takes place in the absence of a
tangible employment action, to which employers may assert" the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense, which will be discussed later. 33 The first category of cases are known as "quidpro
quo" and the second as "hostile work environment."
34
While the Supreme Court in Vinson determined that hostile environment claims required
harassment that was severe or pervasive, 35 Ellerth indicated that the distinction between the two
categories was not the most important inquiry.36 The Court acknowledged that the two distinct
26 1d. at 60.
27 Id. at 64 (second alteration in original).
28 1d. (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n. 13 (1978)).
29 Id. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1985)).
30 Id. at 66.
31 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
32 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
" Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2352 (quoting Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998))..
14 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751.
35 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1 1th
Cir. 1982)).
36 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753.
Winter/Spring 2005
Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest
terms served an important purpose for the Vinson court, and stated that "[t]he principal
significance of the distinction is to instruct that Title VII is violated by either explicit or
constructive alterations in the terms or conditions of employment and to explain the latter must
be severe or pervasive."
37
The Court, in both Ellerth and Faragher, discussed the history of the courts' use of quid
pro quo and hostile work environment. 38 Following the decision in Vinson, the standard of
employer responsibility was based on the type of harassment in which the particular claim fit.
39
Therefore, if the plaintiff could make out a case of quidpro quo harassment, the employer was
subject to vicarious liability for harassment that occurred at the hand of a supervisor. 40 The Court
in Ellerth, however, felt as if linking the categorization of the claim as either quidpro quo or
hostile work environment to the level of employer liability merely encouraged Title VII plaintiffs
to bring their claims under the quidpro quo heading. 41 As a result, the Court felt that it was
more important to analyze the basic question of whether an employer can be held vicariously
liable for the harassing behavior of its supervisors.42
C. Employer Liability for Supervisor's Actions
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders concerns constructive discharge resulting from
hostile work environment harassment that occurred at the hands of a supervisor. 43 This was also
the main issue in Ellerth and Faragher.44 The Court in Ellerth pointed out that Title VII's
definition of "employer" included the employer's "agents." 45 Despite this, both Ellerth and
Faragher implied that determining whether to hold the employer liable is much more difficult
when the plaintiff has been the victim of harassment that resulted in constructive discharge, as
opposed to adverse, tangible actions.46 Therefore, using agency principles, the Ellerth and
Faragher courts determined that the threshold question when assessing employer liability is
whether the agent of the employer (supervisor) "was aided in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relation."
47
1. Tangible Employment Actions
In an effort to delineate between when an employer is and is not responsible for the
harassing conduct of its supervisors, the Court in Ellerth and Faragher created a requirement
that a tangible employment action must occur for the employer to be held vicariously liable.
48
According to the Ellerth Court, "[a] tangible employment action constitutes a significant change
37 d at 752.38 Id. at 752-53; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 784-87.
'9 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752-53.
40 Id. at 753. See Newton v. Cadwell Labs., 156 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 1998); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773
(2d Cir. 1994); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994).
41 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753.
42 Id. AccordSuders, 124 S. Ct. at 2346-47; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
43 Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2352.
44 id.
41 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)).
46 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762-3; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
47 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801, 803; see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758.
48 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-61; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804.
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in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." 49 When such an
action has occurred at the hands of the supervisor, it becomes evident that the injury resulting
from the harassment would not have been possible without the agency relationship the supervisor
has with the employer. 50 The supervisor is using his power to inflict an injury that cannot be
inflicted by a co-worker who does not have the power to influence employment decisions.
51
According to the Court, "[t]angible employment actions fall within the special province of the
supervisor. The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent to
make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her control. 52 As a result, for
the purposes of Title VII claims, a supervisor's tangible employment action vicariously becomes
the act of the employer.53
Appellate courts were split over whether a constructive discharge is a "tangible
employment action" for purposes of employer vicarious liability. The Third, Fifth, and Eighth
Circuits held that a constructive discharge qualifies as a tangible employment action. 54 The
Second and Eleventh Circuits disagreed.55 The United States Supreme Court, in Suders,
answered the call to resolve this dispute between the circuits.
D. The Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense to Employer Vicarious Liability
After establishing that employers could be held vicariously liable for their supervisors'
actions in hostile work environment cases, Ellerth and Faragher set forth an affirmative defense
to employer liability.56 The United States Supreme Court determined that when no tangible
employment action was taken, a two-part affirmative defense was available to employers.5 7 The
two parts of this defense are "that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior," and "that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise. 58 The Supreme Court in Suders clarified when this defense can be used
and established the burdens of proof that rest on both parties in such a circumstance.
IV. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders
In the wake of Ellerth and Faragher, many issues concerning constructive discharge in
Title VII hostile environment cases began to arise. The Suders Court clarified many of these
49 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
5 0 1d. at 761-62.
511d. at 762.
52 id.
53 id.
54 See Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co., 297 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2002); Jackson v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 272 F.3d
1020 (8th Cir. 2001); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1999).
55 See Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272 (1 1th Cir. 2003); Caridad v. Metro-North
Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999).
56 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
57 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
58 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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issues for the first time, discussing the use of constructive discharge claims under Title VII
hostile environment cases, and the functionality of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.
A. Facts of the Case
In August 1998, Nancy Drew Suders resigned from her position as dispatcher for the
Pennsylvania State Police, claiming that she had been sexually harassed by her supervisors.
59
Suders asserted that her decision to quit stemmed from the sexual harassment, but also described
a situation in which her supervisors had accused her of theft and handcuffed her.
60
According to Suders, three of her immediate supervisors had subjected her to such
harassing behavior as discussing sex with animals in front of her, conversing about young girls
performing oral sex, and imitating a television wrestling move that involved grabbing genitals
while shouting out an invitation for oral sex.61 Following theses actions, Suders went to the
police department's Equal Employment Opportunity Officer and mentioned that she "might need
some help." 62 Two months later, Suders again approached the EEO Officer about the
harassment, at which time she was advised that she should file a complaint but was not instructed
how to do so or how to obtain the necessary form to begin the process.63 Two days later,
following the theft accuation, she resigned.64 Suders then sued the Pennsylvania State Police
department, claiming sexual harassment and constructive discharge in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.65
B. Procedural Posture
The District Court granted summary judgment to the police department.66 The court held
that although Suders' testimony was sufficient to allow the jury to find that her supervisors
created a hostile work environment, the Pennsylvania State Police Department was not
vicariously liable for the supervisors' conduct because by failing to file a complaint and
resigning only two days after first mentioning the harassment, Suders did not give the
department the chance to respond to her complaints. 67 Therefore, the District Court essentially
applied the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.
68
The Third Circuit reversed, holding that "genuine issues of material fact existed
concerning the effectiveness of the [Pennsylvania State Police]'s 'program ... to address sexual
harassment claims.' 69 The appellate court also held that a constructive discharge amounted to a
59 Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2346 (2004).
60 Id. at 2347-48.
6 1
1d.
6 2 1d. at 2348.
63 id.
64 id.
65 id.
66 Id. at 2347.
67 Id. at 2349.
68 See id.
69 Id. at 2350 (quoting Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 443 (3d Cir. 2003)).
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tangible employment action for purposes of employer liability. 70 The police department
challenged this ruling.
71
C. Analysis - The Majority Opinion
Justice Ginsburg began the opinion by reaffirming the basic notion that in order to
establish a claim of constructive discharge as a result of sexual harassment, the plaintiff must
show that the harassing conduct was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
[their] employment., 72
1. Hostile Work Environment
The first question the Court set out to answer was which of the two Ellerth/Faragher
"hostile environment" categories Suders' claim fit within. As aforementioned, these two
categories are (1) harassment that culminates in a tangible employment action for which
employers are strictly liable, and (2) harassment that takes place in the absence of a tangible
employment action, to which employers may assert an affirmative defense.73 The Suders court
stated that the case at hand presented a "worse case" harassment scenario, in which the harassing
conduct of the supervisors was so unbearable that Suders resigned.74
2. Extenstion of the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense
Suders held that "when an official act does not underlie the constructive discharge," the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense must be extended to the employer.75 Otherwise, the Court
reasoned, the employer may have no reason to know that the resignation is not a typical, day-to-
day employee resignation.76 Without an official act such as a pay cut or demotion, it is less clear
to what extent the supervisor's harassment has been aided by the agency relationship with the
employer.77 "That uncertainty, our precedent establishes, justifies affording the employer the
chance to establish, through the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, that it should not be held
vicariously liable. 7T
This portion of the Court's holding overruled the Third Circuit's decision that the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense would only be available to cases of hostile work
environment that did not involve a constructive discharge.79 The Court said that if the line were
drawn in this manner, hostile environment constructive discharge cases would be easier to prove
than "ordinary" hostile work environment cases.80
70 id.
71 Id. at 2347.
72 Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)) (alteration in original).
73 See supra text accompanying note 17.
74 SUders, 124 S. Ct. at 2355.
75 id.
76 id.
77 id
7 8 
id
79 1d at 2357.
80 Id. at 2355-56.
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The Court distinguished the decisions of two Courts of Appeals concerning how the
"tangible employment action" criteria should be considered when a plaintiff brings a constructive
discharge claim. In Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc., 8 the First Circuit held that a
supervisor's sexually harassing conduct that led to the resignation of a female employee involved
no official action. The appellate court held that unofficial behavior such as this was the prime
reason the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense was created, and therefore the affirmative
defense was wholly available to the employer. 83 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in the
case of Robinson v. Sappington84 held that sexually harassing behavior by a supervisor that
resulted in a threat that "her first six months... probably would be 'hell"' involved an official
action when the female employee was transferred.85 In Suders, the Court noted that the "courts
in Reed and Robinson properly recognized that Ellerth and Faragher, which divided the universe
of supervisor-harassment claims according to the presence or absence of an official act, mark the
path constructive discharge claims based on harassing conduct must follow."
86
4. Respective Parties' Burdens of Proof
The Suders Court concluded that a plaintiff to a hostile work environment case without
tangible employment action bears the duty to mitigate the harm caused by the harassment, but
the burden is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff did not uphold this duty.87 Therefore,
the Court agreed with the Third Circuit that the case presented genuine issues of material fact
concerning Suders' hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims.88 However, the
Court held that the Third Circuit erred in holding the employer's affirmative defense unavailable
in constructive discharge cases. 89 This led the Court to vacate the Third Circuit's judgment and
remand the case for further proceedings. 90
C. Justice Thomas's Dissent
Justice Thomas argued that only a negligent employer should be liable for constructive
discharge claims resulting from their supervisors' creation of a hostile work environment.
91
Thomas felt as if the Court created a definition of constructive discharge that no longer
resembled an actual discharge, because "as it is currently conceived, a 'constructive' discharge
does not require a 'company act[] that can be performed only by the exercise of specific
authority granted by the employer,' nor does it require that the act be undertaken with the same
purpose as an actual discharge." 92 Justice Thomas concluded that because Nancy Suders did not
" 333 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003).82 Id. at 33.
83 id.
84 351 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2003).
851 Id. at 324, 337.
86 Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2356.
87 1d. at 2357.
8 8 id.
89 id
90 Id.
91 Id. at 2358 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767 (1998)).
92 Id. (quoting Burlington, 524 U.S. at 768) (alteration in original).
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present sufficient evidence of an adverse employment action, nor evidence that her employer
should have known of the harassment, the Third Circuit's decision should have been reversed.
93
V. Conclusion: Future Impacts of Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders
The impact of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania State Police v.
Suders will most directly impact employers and their employment practices. As a practical
matter, employers will now have the peace of mind of knowing that an affirmative defense is
available when employees are constructively discharged as a result of supervisors' unofficial
harassing behavior. However, this case paves the way for a number of precautions that
employers will likely take in the future.
First and foremost, Suders makes it extremely important for employers to implement
well-defined grievance procedures through which employees can file official complaints
concerning harassment. These programs must be readily available to every employee, and the
employer is charged with ensuring that each employee is aware of their existence. Employers
who take actions such as this and who promptly react and investigate any harassment complaints
entered by employees will increase the likelihood of prevailing via the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense, by demonstrating that the employer does not condone the harassing
behavior. Also, employees who fail to take advantage of such complaint procedures will be very
unlikely to prevail against their employers under a constructive discharge claim, because it will
be clear that the employer was not given the opportunity to remedy the situation.
Employers must also keep in mind the holding in Suders that the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense is not available when the supervisor's harassment culminates in an "official"
employment action, such as a cut in pay or a demotion.94 This creates a situation in which
employers must investigate everyday resignations and terminations as possible instances of
supervisor harassment. The employers must carefully choose and educate supervisors, and
cautiously watch over the supervisors' negative "official acts" against employees.
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders is a historical case in the realm of employment law.
It clarifies a number of unanswered issues from the precedent cases of Burlington Industries v.
Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton. While allowing the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense against employer liability in certain cases, Suders also creates a number of safety
precautions that employers must implement in order to avoid liability. Therefore, this decision
effectively results in rewards to employers for implementing programs to prevent and punish for
sexual harassment, and allows employees the opportunity to hold employers vicariously liable
when supervisors' harassment culminates in an official act, or when the employee takes
advantage of the complaint procedure and the employer fails to remedy the harm.
93 Id. at 2359.
94 Id. at 2355.
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